ABSTRACT: Mental health courts have quickly proliferated in the United States and represent an attempt to expand legal leverage and enhanced treatment access to select persons with severe mental illness who are also involved in the criminal justice system. A national survey of mental health courts has begun to elucidate the procedural, clinical, and operational aspects of these courts and the defendants they adjudicate. A secondary analysis of survey data was performed to determine the similarities and differences among these courts. Results revealed large variability among existing mental health courts across multiple domains. The implications of this variability are discussed in terms benefits and limitations.
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the past decade, there has been growing momentum behind use of courts to promote outpatient mental health treatment (Watson et al., 2001; Poythress et al., 2002; Kaye, 2004) . Most prominently, many states have enacted outpatient commitment laws that provide for an array of treatment services that may be ordered by courts for patients with severe mental illnesses and who have histories of treatment noncompliance and/or violence (Hiday, 2003; Swartz et al., 2001) . Although controversial, these initiatives have been endorsed by certain government and legal bodies, advocacy groups, and mental health professionals as a means of promoting engagement in treatment among a subgroup of patients who often fail traditional outpatient treatment. The growing interface between mental health service delivery and the courts has been influenced by the emergence of therapeutic jurisprudence as a theory to guide transformation of courts into problem-solving venues, especially for persons with severe mental illnesses who cycle frequently through hospital emergency rooms and the criminal justice system (Winick, 1997) .
For years, many have noted that a fragmented mental health system impedes access to appropriate psychiatric care for patients caught in the revolving door (Talbot, 1985) . In turn, realizing that the dream of a ''hospital without walls'' has not fully materialized, many clinicians and advocacy groups have called for a more proactive approach in which mental health systems are integrated with other institutions to enable access to psychiatric services for the persons with severe mental illnesses. As a result, many states have pursued new methods to divert individuals with severe mental disorders from the criminal justice system to community-based treatment services . For example, several states have implemented modified assertive community treatment programs to manage patients with histories of criminal recidivism, realizing that traditional assertive treatment programs have shortcomings in dealing with this challenging population. (Lamberti, Weisman, & Faden, 2004; Cimino & Jennings, 2002; Lurigio, Fallon, & Dincin, 2000) .
Among new models of care, perhaps the most rapidly proliferating and visible approach has been the mental health court, an intervention that followed the widespread adoption of drug courts in the United States during the 1990s (Wolff, 2002) . The impetus behind development of specialized mental health courts has been the growing realization that persons with mental illnesses are overrepresented in the criminal justice system in the United States (Ditton, 1999; Lamb & Weinberger, 1998) . Studies indicate that the prevalence of persons with severe mental illnesses in jails and prisons ranges from 6 to 16%, substantially higher rates than that of the general population (Health Care Reform, 1993) . As a consequence, many have raised concern about this overrepresentation and have called for approaches that treat, and do not criminalize, mental health problems (National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, 2001; National Mental Health Association, 2003; Consensus Project, 2002) .
Mental health courts, although in existence since the mid-1990s, have risen in popularity subsequent to enactment of the America's Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project in 2000, which allocated federal funding for their creation (114 Stat 2399 (2000)). Borrowing certain problem-solving principles from the drug court model, mental health courts attempt to end the ''revolving door syndrome'' of persons with mental disorders who cycle frequently through the criminal justice system by referring them to community-based mental health treatment programs with prolonged court supervision (Steadman, Davidson, & Brown, 2001) . In lieu of prosecution, defendants usually agree to participate in treatment, which may include psychotropic medication, individual and group therapy, drug detection screens, and intensive case management (Slate, 2003) . Sanctions for noncompliance vary, ranging from a verbal reprimand from the supervising judge to incarceration or reinstatement of the original criminal charge(s) and subsequent prosecution (Cristy, et al., 2005; Poythress et al., 2002; Griffin, Steadman, & Petrila, 2002) .
While the emergence of mental health courts is premised on the notion that some defendants with severe mental illnesses require a vastly different approach in terms of criminal adjudication, the paucity of research regarding their effectiveness is noteworthy. This fact is underscored by critical evaluation of drug courts, which some argue have failed to demonstrate their effectiveness in reducing recidivism or relapse (Christie & Anderson, 2003) , although others disagree with this conclusion (Bouffard & Taxman, 2004; Anspach & Ferguson, 2003; Cooper, 2003) .
Given their rapid proliferation, the lack of a coherent mental health court model, and concern among certain consumer advocacy groups regarding their use (Bernstein & Seltzer, 2003; NMHA, 2003) , the emergence of mental health courts holds potential promise for improved integrated care. However, it also risks bringing more persons with mental illnesses within the ambit of specialized criminal proceedings that are designed to deemphasize the traditional zealous advocacy role of the defense attorney. While this departure from customary criminal adjudication holds the promise of fostering partnerships between mental health services and the criminal justice system, (Wenzel, Turner, & Ridgely, 2004) it potentially accomplishes this at the expense of minimizing or forgoing certain due process and self-incrimination rights that would apply in traditional court settings.
METHODS
A copy of the December 2004 GAINS Survey of Mental Health Courts (GAINS Survey) was obtained from the center's website (The National GAINS Center, 2005) . The GAINS center is a policy research center, funded by Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, whose mission is to focus research on persons with co-occurring mental health and substance abuse issues who are involved in the criminal justice system. To our knowledge, the GAINS center has completed the only national survey of mental health court practices. The purpose of the GAINS survey was to gather applicable information regarding mental health courts nationwide that can be of use to professionals involved in these courts or to those contemplating starting a new mental health court. The GAINS survey is an on-going endeavor, with updates added approximately every 6 months as new mental health courts are established. The GAINS Survey utilized telephone interviews to ascertain basic operational information among mental health courts nationwide. Courts were included in the survey if they: (1) were adult criminal courts; (2) had a separate docket dedicated to persons with mental illnesses; (3) diverted criminal defendants from jail into treatment programs; and (4) monitored the defendants during treatment, reserving an option to impose criminal sanctions for failure to comply (The National GAINS Center, 2005). Information regarding selection criteria and response rates among participants was not available, however, given the dearth of information regarding mental health courts, the GAINS survey represents a commendable, albeit, initial assessment of mental health court practices nationwide.
A secondary analysis of the GAINS Survey was conducted to determine the extent to which surveyed mental health courts were similar or different, and to document the varied use of sanctions for treatment noncompliance. The survey was reviewed for pertinent information regarding demographics, treatment services, and criminal adjudication. Descriptive variables cited by a majority of reporting courts included: eligibility requirements, including diagnostic criteria, plea bargaining, classification of criminal conduct under the state's pertinent criminal statute (e.g., misdemeanors v. felonies), violent crimes, and substance abuse exclusions. In addition, information regarding sanctions for treatment noncompliance, final disposition of the criminal charge(s), funding mechanisms, and court characteristics were identified. Although some programs reported a census and number of graduates, an insufficient number of programs reported these variables to arrive at any meaningful conclusions, and hence, it was excluded from the present analysis. Descriptive analysis was conducted on all data using SPSS 13.0 (SPSS 13.0, 2004) . This study was approved by the University of Rochester Medical Center Research Subject Review Board as an exempted study.
RESULTS
Results reveal that a majority of states (38) have mental health courts, with a total of 110 courts operating nationwide. In terms of eligibility criteria, twenty-eight percent (31) require a diagnosis of ''mental illness,'' while another 38% (31) required an ''Axis I'' diagnosis for admission. Only 21% (24) require the presence of a severe and persistent mental illness or its variant (e.g., ''severe mental illness''). Eighteen percent (20) of courts did not provide any diagnostic eligibility criteria. Most MHCs are relatively new, with 50% (55) created within the past 3 years. Federal grants were utilized in 49% (54) of MHCs, private grants in 4% (4), no special funding in 5% (5), and 39% (43) had no funding information listed.
Most (98%, 108) indicated that they accept misdemeanant defendants, while 27% (30) accept those charged with felonies, and 4% (4) accepted defendants charged with violent felonies. Plea bargains were required for admission to 43% (47) of courts surveyed. Twenty-six percent (29) indicated that criminal charges are eventually dismissed upon completion of the program, while 15% (16) use probation and 13% (14) employed suspended sentences.
Sanctions for treatment noncompliance used in MHCs varied as well, with 24% (26) reporting using incarceration as a sanction, 22% (24) reported that they ''modify treatment'' as a sanction, with no detailed descriptions of this sanction given; 14% (15) terminated participants from the program and subsequently reinstated the original charge; 14% (14) used other methods such as community service; and most courts (59%, 65) did not report which, if any, sanctions are used. Additionally, no data was presented regarding the frequency with which criminal sanctions (e.g., incarceration) were used versus non-criminal sanctions (e.g., increasing the intensity of treatment).
DISCUSSION
The results of the GAINS Survey reveal wide variability among mental health courts in the United States. Nearly half of the surveyed courts utilize plea-bargaining as a means of handling the original criminal charge, a practice that has been somewhat successful in drug courts (Goldkamp, White, & Robinson, 2001 ). However, given the impaired cognition that often accompanies many mental disorders (Hayebrand, Wesier, Rabinowitz, Hoff, & DeLisi, 2004) , there is little evidence to suggest that mental health courts ensure that prospective candidates are competent to accept these plea bargains, as required under constitutional law (Dusky v. U.S., 1960). Criminal dispositions can have profound implications, including loss of employment, eviction from residential services, forfeiture of the right to vote, and enduring stigma. Thus, it is imperative that mental health courts have appropriate safeguards in place to protect incompetent defendants from accepting plea bargains that may lead to mental health treatment but violate fundamental constitutional protections afforded to all criminal defendants.
Moreover, mental health courts, like drug courts, place defense attorneys in a potentially conflicting position between a traditional role of zealously advocating for their clients and an emerging role of collaborating with the various members of the mental health court to ensure treatment adherence. This dual role of defense counsel has been previously criticized as intruding on attorney-client privilege and marginalizing the need for counsel to pursue the client's ''self-interest goals'' (Boldt, 1998) . This fact alone, notwithstanding possible biases among some attorneys against persons with mental illness (Perlin, 2003) , raises concerns as to whether defendants in mental health courts receive adequate representation by their attorneys.
The variety of sanctions employed by mental health courts is also potentially problematic. Incarceration may be an appropriate legal method of handling a defendant who violates a court's order, but it is probably inappropriate in terms of mental health treatment and may exacerbate psychiatric symptoms. Termination from mental health courts also poses the dilemma of expelling defendants from readily accessible treatment and returning them to a criminal justice system that is unlikely to have the resources to deal effectively with persons with severe mental illnesses.
More critically, the survey points to a lack of guiding philosophy to guide development of mental health courts. While many mental health courts accept persons with ''mental illness'' broadly defined (i.e., ''Axis I''), typically mental health diversion programs have been reserved for those with severe mental disorders such as schizophrenia and similar psychotic illnesses. While the dearth of regulations may allow for innovation among these courts, the disparate eligibility criteria, final legal dispositions, and sanctions invite practices and structures among courts that are not supported by sound evidence-based research. Furthermore, the lack of a unifying definition of what constitutes a ''mental health court'' makes evaluation of these courts difficult.
An additional issue is that even the best designed mental health courts face the enduring problem of having sufficient, high-quality community-based mental health services and supports to refer eligible defendants. Some may perceive the authority of the court as a means of ''opening the door'' to precious mental health services, yet the GAINS Survey contains little data to support or refute this conclusion. Mental health courts are limited by the resources available in the community, which vary widely and are subject to changing fiscal priorities within local, state, and federal systems (Appelbaum, 2003; Bernstein & Seltzer, 2003) . Since it is likely that outcomes in mental health courts are highly correlated with treatment availability, quality, and comprehensiveness, conclusions about their success should be tempered by the understanding that availability of treatment varies geographically and temporally. Further attention should be given to the presence or absence of appropriate community mental health services as a variable in determining the structure, function and effectiveness of mental health courts. Similarly, research should clarify the effects of court mandates on overall access to limited community resources, including non-mandated clients who are potentially crowded out (Bernstein & Seltzer, 2003) .
A further area of concern is that the GAINS Survey mentions little about what happens to defendants involved in mental health courts once they complete the program. Certainly, it is crucial that follow-up care be provided to reduce recidivism and repeat hospital admissions, especially inasmuch as these goals match the inherent mission of mental health courts. Yet, it also begs the question of how long mental health courts should maintain jurisdiction over defendants' treatment. That is if, in fact, mental health courts improve access to mental health services, should court jurisdiction be expanded substantially (or permanently) to persons with severe mental illnesses who are partially or fully unresponsive to voluntary treatment? Even if clinically sound, does this not subject defendants with mental illnesses to longer supervision than would be the case but for the mental illness? Given the scare public mental health resources available in many communities, will mental health court defendants be given priority over non-offenders? The outcome to these questions has the propensity to significantly change the outpatient mental health paradigm in favor of coercive treatment as a matter of routine for many persons with severe mental illnesses. Courts should avoid myopic approaches that obscure the more critical long-term efforts needed to reform our fragmented mental health system, instead of promoting prevention and early intervention over late intervention and reliance on the justice system as a ''door'' to gain access to treatment (Bernstein & Seltzer, 2003) .
Additionally, further studies are needed to ascertain what services remain available to graduated mental health court defendants and whether these specialized courts can reduce criminal justice utilization by persons with severe mental illnesses over time.
While some noteworthy preliminary research has been conducted with mental health courts (Poythress et al., 2002) given the substantial fiscal and political resources as well as the vital constitutional and ethical issues raised by mental health courts, additional studies are warranted. Further studies would elucidate the similarities and differences among these courts, assess the efficacy of different approaches, and allow for more broad-based conclusions regarding the benefits and areas of concern that mental health courts bring to the community. Additional legal and ethical scholarship, inclusive of a full range of stakeholder perspectives, including that of consumers and families, is also vital to ensuring that these courts respect important constitutional and ethical principles. This is underscored by the recent development of juvenile mental health courts, where ethical and constitutional concerns (e.g., privacy of medical records, parental consent to treatment) present a myriad of possible quandaries (Harris, Seltzer, & Carter, 2004) .
Benefits of a national discussion that seeks areas of consensus might include an impetus to develop best practices to drive creation of and revision to existing mental health courts and formation of a set of core criteria on which to base more rigorous evaluations to test for effectiveness. National broad-based input might also enhance statewide and national sharing of lessons learned. Current variability among mental health courts may serve to generate useful experiences and to allow for adaptation of court models to match local needs and resources. However, the shift from use of mental health court from a ''demonstration project'' to evidence-based intervention will ultimately require a careful definition of the model and delineation of key variables in order to test its effectiveness for a select group of high-risk defendants. Such research will require some level of uniformity among various mental health courts (i.e., a coherent model) to provide generalizable results that can provide meaningful conclusions about mental health courts and suggest how to improve overall outcome in this novel interface of service delivery and criminal adjudication.
Furthermore, a more uniform and informed model will also help address the significant legal and ethical issues that mental health courts present. While isolated studies on prototypical mental health courts are helpful, they do not answer fundamental questions regarding the use of sanctions and the deemphasized role of defense attorneys in these special proceedings. This issue becomes crucial in mental health courts that handle defendants charged with more serious crimes (e.g., felonies) where coercion is more likely to affect the true voluntary nature of these specialized courts.
The growth of mental health courts presents the public mental health system with a wealth of new challenges and opportunities to effectively engage persons with severe mental illnesses in the criminal justice system and provide therapeutic options where previously few were available. Nonetheless, implementation of these courts should be done carefully and with attention focused on the inherent dangers involved in using the authority of the legal system to effectuate modern mental health policy in an era where a fragmented system and considerable stigma remain attached to these disabling illnesses.
